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MIDDLE EAST

PRAVDA DEFENDS USSR EGYPTIAN POLICY ON EVE OF SADAT U.S. VISIT

On the eve of Egyptian President as-Sadat's visit to the United States, Moscow has finally responded at an authoritative level to his series of increasingly detailed criticisms of Soviet behavior with a 25 October PRAVDA "Observer" article. Moscow frequently uses this vehicle to give an added ring of authority to standard positions, but the current article takes on added significance since it is the first article on Soviet-Egyptian relations attributed to Observer since May 1961.* While the article did not attack as-Sadat by name nor mention his U.S. visit directly, its publication on the 25th was a transparent rebuttal of his statements and clearly timed to coincide with his departure from Cairo for the first official visit by an Egyptian president to the United States. The article has also been widely publicized, with TASS carrying the full text and Moscow radio broadcasting summaries and installments in Arabic and other languages.

As in earlier, low-level Soviet comment, the Observer article ostensibly responded to "Egyptian press" criticism of Soviet Mideast policies, in particular Moscow's relations with Cairo. It broke no new ground in critical comment on Egypt or on the Sinai II accord, but did recapitulate Moscow's past position on several key divisive issues in Soviet-Egyptian relations since the October 1973 war. The underlying message was that Soviet support to Egypt in the past had been generous and consistent, and that as-Sadat was unwise and unjustified in turning to the United States for aid and closer ties.

Moscow has said little about as-Sadat's U.S. visit. TASS items on the 27th and 29th sought through selective citations to contrast as-Sadat's optimistic expectations of U.S. aid with American hesitancy to provide such assistance. Similarly, IZVESTIYA political observer M. Mikhaylov, on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable

* The 1961 PRAVDA Observer article came in a period of Soviet-Egyptian recriminations over Egyptian anticommunism, and followed a meeting in Moscow between Khrushchev and an Egyptian parliamentary delegation led by as-Sadat, at which Khrushchev lectured the Egyptians on their lack of understanding of socialism. Cairo's AL-AHRAM in June 1961 released Khrushchev's remarks and a subsequent as-Sadat reply insisting, then as now, on Egyptian independence and rejecting the idea that communism and capitalism are the only alternatives.

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on the 26th, recalled U.S. assurances to Israel on financial and military aid in conjunction with the Sinai II accord and alleged that Washington recently indicated "in response to Israeli inquiries" that Egypt "will not receive any substantial credits" during as-Sadat's U.S. visit or before the 1976 U.S. presidential election.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN
RELATIONS

In defending Soviet policy toward Egypt, the PRAVDA Observer emphasized that Moscow, unlike the Western powers, was responsive to Egypt's requests and requirements for economic and military assistance after the July 1952 revolution. Observer's message to Cairo appeared to be that it would not be in Egypt's best interests to turn away from ties with the USSR and toward uncertain relations with the United States.

+ Economic assistance. Recounting Moscow's past economic aid, Observer recalled that after the 1952 revolution Egypt was able to obtain reliable economic support only from the socialist countries, and that this support had steadily expanded until some 148 industrial projects had been undertaken with Soviet assistance. Observer underlined that these projects had brought Egypt substantial revenues and increases in living standards. Referring to the Aswan hydroelectric complex and the Helwan metallurgical works, Observer contrasted the Soviet and Western attitudes toward these projects, asserting that "former colonial powers, one after another, rejected participation in building Aswan and expanding the Helwan combine."

Observer's historical review of Soviet aid to Egypt culminated in an image that epitomized the ingratitude of those who "from the pages of some Egyptian papers" had derided the significance of Soviet assistance, even though "perhaps when scribbling their slander-packed articles, they were doing so under the electric light coming from Aswan."

+ Military aid: Observer reflected strong resentment over the "shameless distortions" regarding Soviet military assistance to Egypt. Contrasting Soviet and Western attitudes, Observer recounted the history of Soviet military aid to Egypt since 1955 through the October 1973 war. Observer emphasized that Moscow had responded to an-Nasir's first requests, had "fully restored" Egypt's June 1967 losses with top-quality replacements, and during the 1973 war had provided "uninterrupted flow by sea and air of Soviet arms and ammunition to Egypt and Syria." Observer asserted that in view of Moscow's record, only "utter shamelessness" would enable anyone to claim, "as some are doing now," that "Egypt then received from the Soviet Union 'several bagfuls of spare parts.'"

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Observer capped the historical review with an implicit warning that unless Cairo shaped up, it might not receive the arms still outstanding under already concluded contracts--part of which, as-Sadat complained in a Kuwaiti press interview on 22 October, "are being withheld today." Thus Observer defended Soviet post-war military aid to Egypt as fulfilling obligations "under existing agreements," but cautioned Cairo that "this is known to be a bilateral thing. Cooperation cannot develop if one of the sides follows the line of undermining it."

+ USSR-Egypt treaty: Clearly referring to as-Sadat, Observer complained that "some in Egypt" claimed that the 27 May 1971 Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation was practically imposed on Egypt. Observer said that it was a "strange sort of forgetfulness" not to recall which country was the first to raise the question of a treaty, and he explicitly recalled that as-Sadat--in a 2 June 1971 speech--had said that "we wanted the treaty" and "I have sought to sign the treaty with the Soviet Union in the name of our future and the future of our children."

As-Sadat in fact did say, in his 28 September speech, that Egypt had sought a treaty in the an-Nasir era, but the Soviet Union had at that time refused. He recounted his astonishment when Podgornyy, during his May 1971 visit to Cairo, all but pleaded for the conclusion of a treaty. As-Sadat in effect implied that Podgornyy could not return to Moscow without one, citing him as saying that "the Politburo has adopted a decision authorizing me to conclude a treaty with you" and as arguing for it "in every possible way." As for Observer's charge of "forgetfulness," as-Sadat had leveled the same accusation against the Soviets in an earlier speech when he said, on 15 September, that they had "a weak memory" and thought that he was "not paying attention."

+ Debt Repayment: Consistent with past Soviet reticence, Observer avoided any mention of the divisive issue of Cairo's debt repayments for past economic and military aid. As-Sadat has repeatedly cited this as one of his two main problems with the Soviets, along with the arms issue. Moscow's only known allusion to the matter, an Arabic-language commentary last June on the reopening of the Suez Canal, implied that the new source of hard currency from canal fees should help alleviate Egypt's financial difficulties, which had caused it to seek financial aid from oil-producing countries and "the postponement of repayment of foreign debts."

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Moscow apparently has rebuffed Cairo's attempts to renegotiate the terms and schedule of repayment. Egypt's finance minister said in a statement to the Kuwaiti magazine AL-YAQAZAH, reported by Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 28 October, that Egypt intended to repay all its debts to the USSR, even though "Moscow does not want to give Egypt a period of grace as a breather." In July the finance minister had led a delegation to Moscow for talks on this subject; the talks (from 22 July-2 August) evidently ended without resolution. Soviet media, for their part, barely acknowledged the visit and were uninformative on its purpose or outcome.*

ARAB-ISRAELI
ISSUE

The Observer article strongly denied charges--made by as-Sadat on several occasions--that the USSR had provoked Syrian and other Arab criticism of the Sinai II accord. Observer broached the accusation in a lead paragraph, citing it as an example of how far some "Egyptian press" allegations against the USSR had gone and regretting that "those who determine [Egypt's] policies" had not renounced the charges. Observer's defense took the tack that the Arab criticism demonstrated support for the Soviet position on a comprehensive Mideast settlement and that the terms of the Sinai II accord itself had motivated the criticism. Observer suggested that Egypt should blame itself for signing the accord, rather than "placing the blame at the wrong door and accusing the USSR of undermining Arab unity.

Recalling major criticisms of the accord, Observer essentially restated points made in Soviet and Arab media over the past two months. For instance, the article asserted that Egypt had retrieved a "negligibly small part of its territory" while at the same time "blunting the urgency" of regaining the other occupied Arab territories and insuring Palestinian rights. Observer particularly objected to the presence of U.S. personnel in the new disengagement zone, criticizing this aspect along lines of previous Soviet comment as "a new element in the Mideast situation, fraught with far-reaching dangerous consequences." As had previous Soviet comment, Observer drew an analogy between the U.S. presence in the Sinai and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which had expanded from "the introduction of a relatively small number of American personnel."

Advocating a comprehensive Mideast settlement, Observer reaffirmed positions Moscow has long been on record as favoring:

+ Elements of a settlement: Observer reiterated Moscow's standard three prerequisites for a comprehensive settlement: complete Israeli

* See the TRENDS of 23 July, page 7 and 13 August, page 11.

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withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in June 1967; assurance of the Palestinians' "legitimate national rights, including the right to create their own state"; and the assurance of independent existence and development of all states in the region.

+ Geneva conference: Observer reaffirmed that the Geneva conference would provide "an appropriate international mechanism" through which a comprehensive Mideast settlement could be achieved, and reiterated that "all sides directly involved in the conflict" must take part, "including the PLO, as well as the USSR and the United States as conference cochairmen."

+ "Partial" settlements: Reviving a formula initially set forth in a 22 April 1975 Soviet-Egyptian communique and referred to only occasionally since then, Observer stated that the USSR does not reject the possibility of partial or interim agreements but that "such partial measures must constitute a component, integral part of a comprehensive settlement" and be "worked out and adopted within the framework of the Geneva conference in full." Observer also echoed some of Moscow's initial criticism of the Sinai II accord--expressed, for example, in a 7 September article by IZVESTIYA's Mikhaylov in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA--that the USSR remained opposed to the use of the Geneva conference "as a screen for approving steps undertaken to obviate the conference."

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PEKING HARSH ON SOVIET MOVES IN MIDEAST, MILD ON U.S.

Sharply contrasting Chinese media treatment of recent U.S. and Soviet diplomacy on Arab-Israeli issues has reemphasized Peking's differentiated views of the two superpowers' policies in the Middle East. An unusually harsh PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article treated as the latest in a series of Soviet maneuvers against the Arab cause the recent Soviet-Israeli bilateral contacts, which culminated in talks between the Soviet and Israeli foreign ministers at the UN General Assembly on 24 September. The belated issuance of the Commentator article a month later--on 25 October--seemed to be timed to coincide with Egyptian President as-Sadat's arrival in the United States on the 26th. Peking's NCNA reported President Ford's welcome for as-Sadat in Washington on 28 October in a brief, straightforward account typical of Chinese media handling of high-level U.S.-Egyptian contacts.

The latest PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article was the first authoritative comment in the Chinese party daily focused on Soviet Middle East policy in two years, as well as China's first public assessment of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in the Middle East since the second Israeli-Egyptian Sinai disengagement accord was initialed under Secretary Kissinger's auspices on 1 September. The article, as well as a companion 25 October NCNA commentary, depicted Moscow's position in the Middle East as "weakening" and "extremely difficult," noting that the Soviets were "being expelled here and there." The "other superpower" was seen as on the "offensive" and as "energetically pushing shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East," causing Moscow to resort to closer ties with Israel in order to shore up its sagging position.

Commentator explicitly speculated on the likelihood of resumed Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations as a result of the Gromyko-Allon meeting last month, portraying such a step as the latest in a series of alleged Soviet moves against Arab interests. Commentator reviewed past Chinese charges of Soviet willingness to allow Jews residing in the USSR to emigrate to Israel and of Moscow's alleged refusal to supply sufficient arms to Arab forces. The NCNA commentary added that the Soviets have attempted to woo Israel to support Moscow's Geneva conference peace plan by affirming "once and again their readiness to 'guarantee Israel's security' at the expense of the interests of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people."

Underlining its warning to the Arabs, Commentator claimed that Moscow was "capable of anything, however foul," in its fierce struggle against the United States for influence in the Middle East. Commentator asserted that avowed Soviet support for international revolutionary causes was belied by the fact that Moscow had "desperately hung on to the political corpse of the traitorous Lon Nol clique" in Cambodia and that Moscow was endeavoring to "sabotage" Korean reunification by "flirting with the South Korean Pak Chong-hui clique."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW SEES INCREASED PRC HOSTILITY, SINO-U.S. DIFFERENCES

Moscow's continuing criticism of China took a new turn recently when TASS Director General Leonid Zamyatin claimed on Soviet television and radio that Peking had further escalated its hostility toward the USSR. Speaking on 24 October on a biweekly Moscow domestic radio panel discussion of international issues, Zamyatin said Peking was "unleashing a new phase of its struggle against the Soviet Union" and cited specific Chinese actions allegedly designed to curtail bilateral relations. The radio on the 24th reported that Zamyatin had made similar charges on Soviet television.

Charges similar to Zamyatin's were first made three days earlier in a TASS commentary by Vladimir Goncharov, reprinted in the central newspapers the next day. In rebutting Peking, Zamyatin and Goncharov went beyond the usual litany of complaints about Chinese foreign policy to cite specific actions affecting bilateral relations that allegedly proved Peking was not limiting itself to "propaganda attacks." Both seemed concerned to discredit the notion that Peking might be showing an interest in normalizing relations at this time. Goncharov asserted that Peking had delayed the signing of the 1975 trade agreement, and "as a result" the level of bilateral trade this year had dropped in comparison with previous years; Zamyatin said that Sino-Soviet trade had been "halved." These charges came less than three months after Moscow radio's announcement of the 1975 trade agreement, reporting that trade was scheduled to reach a volume of 211 million rubles, approximately the 1974 level.

Both Zamyatin and Goncharov also assailed Peking for thwarting the 1975 convening of a regular bilateral conference on navigation in sections of rivers that form part of the Sino-Soviet border. This joint conference is rarely mentioned in Soviet media.

Despite this renewed focus on problems in bilateral relations, there has been no suggestion in Soviet media of any increase in the level of military tension between the two countries. Zamyatin's charges were offered not to justify any Soviet action but to answer unnamed persons who had "recently" suggested that Peking favored the normalization of "interstate relations" between the USSR and China.

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KISSINGER In the midst of such signs of the continuing stale-
IN PEKING mate in Sino-Soviet relations and the recently rough
 sailing in detente with the United States, Soviet
treatment of the recent Peking visit by Secretary of State Kissinger
seemed to reflect a Moscow conclusion that at least the Sino-U.S.
side of the great power triangle was doing no better. Soviet
media noted the Chinese use of the visit for direct attacks on
detente and the USSR, but they left a clear impression of continuing
disagreement between the Secretary and his hosts on this matter.*
An observer on the 26 October Moscow domestic radio roundtable
on foreign affairs, for example, reported that the Chinese
"lectures" against detente made no impression on the visitor
and that differences about detente "existed and remain between
Peking and Washington."

* Initial Soviet reaction to the Secretary's visit is discussed
in the TRENDS of 22 October, pages 2-3.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA EYE ATTITUDES, ROLE OF U.S. CONGRESS

A sophisticated Soviet appreciation of the role of the U.S. Congress in foreign policy and of the variety of political philosophies and personalities represented in its membership is conveyed in a recent series of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA correspondents' articles based on interviews with Senate and House members. The articles illustrate a movement away from the use of cold war stereotypes recently characteristic of some, if not all, Soviet observers of the U.S. political scene.

Clearly written to add "human interest" to the news from Washington, the current articles serve to reinforce Moscow's current concerns about the emergence of trends hostile to detente in official Washington. The overall tone of the articles is optimistic, however, and the correspondents conclude from their interviews that the prospects for a further development of detente are good.

The PRAVDA article, written by Washington correspondents Vasilyev and Kolesnichenko, appeared in three installments published on 17, 21 and 22 October. The IZVESTIYA article, written by Vitaliy Kobysh, was published on the 18th and the 25th. Both were based primarily on interviews with Congressmen who have been strong supporters of the Administrations's detente policy. However, the interviewees also included Senators Thurmond and Stevenson, whose positions Moscow has had occasion to criticize in the past.

Kobysh noted that "the role of Congress in U.S. political life has grown markedly in recent years" and concluded that "if you want a broad picture of U.S. political life, you must climb 'the Hill' from time to time." The PRAVDA series, by focusing on the diversity of Congressional views, served to emphasize the difficulty of making flat predictions about the outcome of issues on Capitol Hill. At one point PRAVDA offered a description of Congress not unlike some conventional Western analyses:

It is an enormous country, contradictory and varied.
And the political spectrum of Congress is just as varied.
The personal views of a Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives, his business ties and the special
features of his electoral district are interrelated
factors which determine a particular legislator's position.

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The PRAVDA correspondents indicated one reason for rekindled Soviet interest in Congress, noting that "the attitude of legislators on Capitol Hill toward the Pentagon's demands is changing, and quite markedly so, in recent times."

The IZVESTIYA article did not hide the fact that one of its purposes was to measure the scope of the difficulties being faced by detente in the wake of what Soviet media have seen as increased activity by its opponents. Kobysh, like PRAVDA's correspondents, attempted to allay any concern by their readers on this question by concluding that "the disposition of forces in the United States has not changed. He quoted Representative Clement Zablocki's admonition not to forget to point out "that all 15 presidential candidates for the nomination of either party, with maybe one exception, have expressed themselves clearly in support of the policy of detente." Perhaps reflecting a view prevalent in Moscow as well, Kobysh concluded by quoting Senator Kennedy's answer to his question about the key to a further development of U.S.-Soviet relations:

The key lies in the success of the current SALT talks; very much depends on when and with what they end.

MOSCOW DEFENSIVE ABOUT DETENTE, VALUE OF SUMMITRY

A defensive note regarding detente and the value of summitry has begun to emerge in Soviet comment in recent weeks, suggesting the possibility that the regime is concerned about internal as well as external criticism in its denunciations of the opponents of detente. Thus far the hints of such concern qualify only as equivocal evidence, but they deserve to be recorded as a possible harbinger of future developments. As the 25th CPSU Congress approaches, a clearer picture should emerge as to whether Brezhnev's foreign policy is among the issues under dispute within the party leadership.

In his major article in KOMMUNIST No. 14, signed to the press on 24 September, Gromyko clearly set forth an apologia for the regime's foreign policy which seemed designed as a program document for the 25th party congress. The foreign minister placed particular stress on the importance of the "agreements and understandings" reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he elsewhere described as the result primarily of "fruitful summit-level negotiations." In making this point, the foreign minister used phraseology with polemical overtones. "The only people who cannot see this (i.e., the value of U.S.-Soviet agreements)," wrote Gromyko, "are those who do not understand the essence of the processes taking place in the world." Neither in this paragraph nor in preceding or following ones was there any indication that this rebuke was aimed solely at foreigners.

A defense of summitry was also offered in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials in following weeks. On 29 September PRAVDA echoed Gromyko's praise of detente, noting that the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations had been "promoted primarily by Soviet-American meetings at the summit level." IZVESTIYA on 21 October offered a somewhat broader endorsement of summitry in the context of commenting on the then recently completed visit of President Giscard d'Estaing to the USSR. "Recent events demonstrate particularly vividly," it said, "the important role of summit meetings for the solution of major international problems and the development of cooperation between states."

Along with these hints of defensiveness, other Soviet authors have been making a case for detente in terms clearly designed to appeal to communist rather than Western readers. One example was an article by I. Gureyev in the journal WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, No. 10, signed to the press on 17 September. He argued, in effect, that detente provided the best possible conditions for the achievement of communist goals, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. This line of Soviet comment has complemented the series of articles authored by such Americanologists as Arbatov and Trofimenko and aimed at presenting the case for detente in terms calculated to appeal to Western minds.

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P R C - W E S T G E R M A N Y

MAO MEETS SCHMIDT, PEKING STRONGLY BACKS GERMAN REUNIFICATION

West German Chancellor Schmidt's first visit to China, which began on 29 October, has triggered Peking's strongest statement of support for German reunification in recent years, predictable Chinese praise for developing PRC-FRG relations, and standard Chinese comments opposing detente and in favor of West European unity and defense preparations against the Soviet Union. The visit began against a background of unusual, intensified and hard-hitting Chinese comment focusing on recent disputes in Soviet-West German relations that arose from the recently concluded Soviet-GDR mutual assistance treaty and from alleged Soviet complaints about West European military defense efforts.

Peking's warm welcome for the German delegation was highlighted by a 30 October "wide-ranging conversation" in a "friendly atmosphere" with Chairman Mao. The Germans were welcomed on arrival by a Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, held working-level talks with Teng, met with NPC Chairman Chu Teh on the 29th, and were feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Teng that evening.

GERMAN REUNIFICATION Teng Hsiao-ping's 29 October address voiced support for the German people's "struggle against the hegemonists' bullying, interference and threats," and the issue of German reunification was treated explicitly in the 29 October PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming Schmidt. Noting that "for reasons known to all" Germany was split after World War II, the editorial affirmed that "the Chinese people deeply sympathize with and support the German people's firm opposition to a permanent splitting up of the German nation and their just desire for national unification."

Peking has avoided such a firm statement of support for German reunification since the turn of the decade, as East-West detente developed in Europe. Over the past year, however, the Chinese have gradually revived attention to German reunification, evidently seeking to complicate what they view as a Soviet effort to solidify the German split, thus consolidating Moscow's sway over East Europe.

Last October NPC Vice Chairman Hsu Hsiang-chien had gone so far as to state, during a banquet speech for visiting FRG legislators, that the Chinese people "understand and sympathize with" the German people's opposition to a permanent split.* And PRC UN Representative

* The statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, pages 17-18.

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Huang Hua has also recently backed away from his past public stance, which had muted support for German reunification while supporting reunification efforts in divided countries such as Korea. In 1973 Huang had softpedaled German reunification and supported UN admission for the two German states; at the same time he strongly supported Korean unification and pointedly criticized a proposal to admit North and South Korea to the United Nations as two states. By contrast, Huang's 21 October speech on the Korean issue at this year's UN General Assembly supported reunification efforts in all divided states, affirming flatly that "all artificially divided countries will eventually realize their national reunification--this is the general trend and popular demand."

SOVIET-GERMAN DIFFERENCES

Teng Hsiao-ping's banquet speech and the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial routinely lauded West German efforts to strengthen West European unity and defense efforts against "that superpower. . . chanting peace most loudly" while "baring its fangs, particularly toward Europe." Soviet-German differences were also highlighted in a series of NCNA and PEOPLE'S DAILY articles issued just prior to Schmidt's arrival. A lengthy 26 October NCNA commentary denounced the recent Soviet treaty with the GDR as a violation of the European Security Conference pronouncements--supported by the FRG--allowing the peaceful change of European boundaries. It also claimed the treaty was a Soviet-fostered framework designed to justify Moscow's heavy military presence in East Germany and continued Soviet hegemony in East Europe under terms of the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty." The article focused on the treaty's affront to the German people's desire for reunification, claiming that the "Brezhnev clique" wanted to "keep Germany in perpetual division" in order to "lord it over Europe," and it noted that Moscow would continue to defy the "will of the German people and interfere in their internal affairs in a most high-handed manner." The East German radio reported on 28 October that the GDR foreign minister took the unusual step of calling in the Chinese ambassador that day to complain about the allegations in the article, which the GDR radio said had been carried in PEOPLE'S DAILY.

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SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

HUANG HUA CALLS UN ATTENTION TO U.S. TROOPS IN KOREAN QUESTION

China's UN representative Huang Hua, speaking on 21 October against U.S. proposals for a Korean settlement and in favor of a Peking-sponsored UN draft resolution on Korea, essentially reiterated the line traced earlier by PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in his 26 September UN speech.* Huang's UN speech, however, did employ harsher characterizations of the U.S. presence in Korea than Chiao had used. Huang Hua described as "downright deception" the U.S. arguments about the need for a "balance of forces" in Korea, charging that the presence of "large numbers" of U.S. troops in the South posed a "grave menace" to the security of the North. Huang Hua also accused U.S. troops in the ROK of carrying out "armed provocations," a charge not known to have been made by Peking at such an authoritative level in more than three years.

Aside from his unusually tough denunciation of U.S. troops in the ROK, Huang followed Chiao's lead in explicitly linking dissolution of the UN Command with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. He also remained silent on two key issues--the DPRK's claim that the end of the UN Command would mean the end of the armistice and Pyongyang's position that the ROK has no right to participate in discussions aimed at continuing the armistice. Like Chiao, Huang did, however, call the U.S. proposal that parties to the armistice convene a conference to discuss ways of preserving the armistice "of no avail and completely impractical."

POLEMICS WITH MOSCOW ON KOREAN ISSUES

A 24 October NCNA correspondent's report reiterated Huang's harsh portrayal of the U.S. presence in Korea, and it went on to argue that "certain countries have no reason to meddle" in the reunification issue, which it called an internal affair Koreans must settle themselves. Reflecting Sino-Soviet tensions on the Korean issue, NCNA renewed Chinese accusations of Soviet perfidy against the DPRK and of Moscow's "hypocritical stand" on Korean reunification, claiming that Moscow had always opposed Pyongyang's principle of "independent" reunification. NCNA charged that the Soviet Union finds it necessary to "grossly alter" the customary DPRK slogan of "independent and peaceful reunification" into "democratic and peaceful" reunification, a phrase frequently used by Moscow in discussing DPRK reunification proposals. The report characterized Soviet support for Korean reunification as a "sham," charging that recent Soviet contacts with the Seoul government reflected Soviet efforts to create "two Koreas."

* For a discussion of Chiao Kuan-hua's 26 September UN speech, see the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 2-4.

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In an authoritative 25 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article focused mainly on Soviet Middle East policy, Peking included a charge that Moscow has "flirted" with the Pak government, "maintaining unusual relations with it" in order to "sabotage" Korean reunification and gain influence in northeast Asia. NCNA reports on two nongovernmental ROK delegations to Moscow in September and earlier this month had charged that the visits revealed Soviet "collusion" with Seoul aimed at obstructing Korean reunification. This same theme also appeared in Peking's last extensive propaganda attack on Moscow on the Korean issue--a November 1974 NCNA correspondent's report rebutting Soviet charges that Peking was prepared to sell South Korea red peppers and countercharging that Moscow was engaged in "collusion" with Seoul and attempting to create "two Koreas."

PEKING MARKS WAR VOLUNTEERS ANNIVERSARY, NOTES SECURITY TIES

Chinese comment on the 25th anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) into the Korean War focused on the historical importance of Korea to China's security. Peking marked the quinquennial, as it had in 1970, by sending to Pyongyang a friendship delegation composed of former Chinese People's Volunteers. In addition, Peking noted the 25th anniversary with a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, just as had been done for the previous, 1970 quinquennial anniversary. In the DPRK the anniversary was marked with a rally and banquet for the PRC delegation, traditional wreath-laying ceremonies for the CPV dead, including one at the grave of Mao Tse-tung's son, and the customary NODONG SINMUN editorial.

Speaking at a 24 October anniversary banquet in Peking, CCP Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien reiterated the Chinese claim that the victory in the Korean war "defended the security of China," an assertion not raised by Chinese speakers at past Peking anniversary functions since 1970, the last quinquennial, although Chinese speakers at Pyongyang observances of the CPV anniversary did make the same claim in speeches in 1972, 1973 and again this year. The 25 October joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, as had a similar joint editorial marking the anniversary in 1970, charged that the United States had intended to invade China during the war. The editorial also included a Kim Il-song quote about the close links between the Chinese and Korean peoples' struggles for safeguarding their security. The last time Chinese comment on the CPV anniversary had included a similar quote was in 1971.

CHINESE COMMENT ON U.S. PRESENCE

Chen's speech comments on the U.S. presence in South Korea appeared softer than those he made on the anniversary last year. This year Chen called the presence of "U.S. aggressor troops" in South Korea the "root cause" of tension in Korea and the chief obstacle to reunification, and

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he offered routine Chinese support for the DPRK's demand that the UN Command be dissolved and U.S. troops withdrawn from the South. By contrast, last year Chen had charged that under U.S. "aegis" the Pak government was disrupting the North-South dialog and suppressing the South Korean people, and he had demanded that the United States "immediately" stop interfering in Kcra's internal affairs and had called for U.S. troops to "pull out of South Korea without delay." Similarly, this year's joint editorial eschewed a harsh portrayal of the U.S. presence in the South, focusing instead on the current UN debate on Korea and the Chinese-supported draft resolution on the Korean question.

At the 24 October Pyongyang mass meeting, the head of the PRC friendship delegation, Li Chih-min, a former political commissar of the CPV, offered the standard Chinese characterization of the U.S. presence in the South, accusing the United States of supporting the Pak regime in sabotaging the North-South talks, in carrying out military provocations against the North, and in suppressing the South Korean people. Li called for dissolution of the UN Command and withdrawal of U.S. troops.

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VIETNAM

PRG TO ALLOW REFUGEE SHIP ENTRY INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

Vietnamese communist authorities have officially announced that the ship transporting 1,500 Vietnamese refugees from Guam will be allowed entry into South Vietnam, but they have not yet acknowledged its arrival. The 25 October PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement containing the announcement made it clear the PRG was reluctantly granting permission for the refugees' return "this time only" and that any future repatriation would have to be accomplished by individual applications through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Earlier PRG and DRV comment had strongly opposed the mass repatriation operation but had never explicitly declared whether the returnees would be accepted.*

Averting that the decision to allow the refugees to return home was "prompted by a policy of humanitarianism and leniency," the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement went on to make clear that the PRG's acquiescence in this instance should not be construed as a precedent for future "illegal" refugee repatriation. Prospective returnees were urged to wait "patiently" for PRG approval of their individual requests and were warned "not to let themselves be taken advantage of by the United States" and to "oppose all ugly acts and tricks of the U.S. imperialists."

The latest statement also alluded to "a number of person serving as lackeys of U.S. imperialists" who had been evacuated with the Americans from Vietnam, but it did not directly declare that anyone in this category was among the current group of returnees aboard the ship. A 17 October LPA commentary broadcast by Saigon radio had been more explicit in this regard, accusing the United States of sending back "a number of its henchmen."

* Earlier Vietnamese comment on the refugee return is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 October 1975, pages 5-6, 16 October 1975, pages 11-12, and 22 October 1975, page 14.

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YUGOSLAVIA

CAMPAIGN CONTINUES AGAINST "COMINFORMISTS," OTHER DISSIDENTS

Increasing attacks by Yugoslav officials and media spokesmen against domestic and foreign opposition have followed in the wake of an editorial against "Cominformism" in the 13 October party weekly KOMUNIST and a 15 October party leadership discussion of "hostile activities" against the party and state.* Although Belgrade has provided few details, it has clearly indicated that the prosecution of a group of pro-Soviet dissidents, and possibly others, is imminent. Despite Western press reports that more than 100 Cominformists are under arrest, Belgrade comment thus far has consistently stressed that the group posed no serious danger to the regime. At the same time Belgrade has pointed out that its current preoccupation with Cominformist activities should not obscure the need for vigilance against opponents of all stripes.

COMINFORMISTS A 28 October Belgrade radio commentary attacking Cominformism provided the most explicit acknowledgment that a prosecution of pro-Soviet dissidents was being prepared, in stating that the Public Prosecutor's Office would "shortly" release a report on the subject. The following day Croatia's under secretary for internal affairs also reported that several unidentified dissident groups were under investigation and would be tried "shortly."

Although Belgrade's use of such codewords as "Cominformism" and "neo-Stalinism" suggest Soviet influence on the dissidents, Belgrade comment has stopped short of alleging direct links between Moscow and the Cominformists. On the few occasions when Belgrade has implied such a link, it has uniformly leveled a similar charge against Western-oriented dissident groups. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Socialist Alliance organ OSLOBODJENJE on the 27th, for example, accused not only Cominformists but also "anarcho-liberals" and "new leftists" of receiving "plans and instructions from the various intelligence centers abroad."

PRO-WESTERN OPPOSITION While acknowledging that its current major concern is Cominformism, Belgrade has also stressed that it is equally wary of pro-Western elements, alleging that they also oppose Yugoslavia's self-management system and nonaligned foreign policy. A frontpage editorial in the 23 October

* See the TRENDS of 22 October 1975, pages 19-20.

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BORBA, for example, asserted that the current campaign against Cominformists "can least of all imply the closing of the front against other attempts to dispute our path and to revise Marxism, against liberalist and separatist forces and against bourgeois ideology." Similarly, Vojvodina party official Vukasin Loncar, according to the 23 October POLITIKA, asserted that Yugoslavia needs neither a "bourgeois consumer society" nor a "Stalinist dogmatic concept of socialism, social development and happiness."

VIGILANCE CAMPAIGN Tito in a speech on the 21st during a tour of western Serbia, exhorted workers to "be vigilant against all attempts to break the unity of our community or to destroy our brotherhood and unity even among the very ranks of our workers." Calls for greater vigilance have focused primarily on the need to strengthen Yugoslavia's new decentralized security system, identified as "social self-protection." Outlined at a party Central Committee Presidium session last July, the system reportedly places primary responsibility for security in the hands of grassroots party and government units. Numerous commentaries have characterized the social self-protection system as an effective weapon against Cominformism and other opposition forces. The 28 October Belgrade radio commentary, for example, asserted that the fact that "we publicly admit that it is only now that we are creating a mechanism of protection for self-management" is an indication of Yugoslavia's strength.

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U S S R

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES MEMBERS CONDEMN SAKHAROV IN OPEN LETTER

Soviet displeasure with the Nobel Peace Prize award to Andrey Sakharov was indicated in its sharpest public manifestation to date with the publication in the 26 October IZVESTIYA of a letter of denunciation signed by 72 members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Denouncing the award as a "provocative" act by the Norwegian Nobel Prize committee, the academicians depicted their colleague Sakharov as a foe of peace and a traitor to his country. If the pattern of the 1973 anti-Sakharov campaign is followed, the letter should spark a sharply intensified public campaign against Sakharov, possibly aimed at forcing his expulsion from the Academy of Sciences.

The Soviet press did not react quickly to the announcement of the award on 9 October, although Moscow broadcasts assailing Sakharov as a foe of peace were immediately beamed abroad to audiences in Europe. LITERARY GAZETTE on 15 October carried a vitriolic article denouncing the award, but PRAVDA did not mention the award until 23 October. The new letter, carried in the 26 October IZVESTIYA but not in PRAVDA, presumably marks the start of the real press campaign. Two years ago a similar letter by 40 academicians attacking Sakharov was published in the 29 August 1973 PRAVDA and was quickly followed by publication of a deluge of similar letters from the Soviet Writers Union, Academy of Arts, Academy of Medical Sciences, Composers Union, other organizations and various individuals.

Among the signers of the present letter are most members of the academy's Presidium and most other academy officials, including such moderates as philosopher A.M. Romyantsev, economist N.P. Fedorenko, and mathematician M.A. Lavrentyev. Fedorenko and Lavrentyev had failed to sign the 1973 letter, although Lavrentyev signed a later letter of the same tenor from the Siberian branch of the academy.

Absent from the list of signers this time is venerable physicist P.L. Kapitsa, who had also refused, with some vehemence, to sign the August 1973 letter. Kapitsa's son, geologist A.P. Kapitsa, did sign, although he had not signed the 1973 letter either. More surprisingly, one of the six academy vice presidents failed to sign: Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, who had signed the August 1973 letter. Among the rank-and-file academicians who did not sign now was mathematician L.V. Kantorovich, the other Soviet scientist to win a Nobel prize this year.

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In recent months party pressure on the academy to expel Sakharov has reportedly provoked resistance by some academicians, but the new press campaign may force the academy to act. Party authorities may attempt to use the impending election of a new academy presidium to exert leverage on the academy regarding Sakharov. An increased party role in selecting the academy's leaders was asserted by Suslov in an unprecedented address to the academy last May. At that time President M.V. Keldysh resigned and Suslov announced that the scheduled election would be postponed until November and that Vice President V.A. Kotelnikov would be "acting" president.*

* See the TRENDS of 29 May 1975, pages 22-24.

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NOTES

PRC NUCLEAR TEST: Peking's 27 October NCNA report on its successful underground nuclear test that day reflected no change in China's nuclear disarmament stance as set forth in the last Peking test announcement of 18 June 1974. Using the concise format adopted in November 1971, the latest announcement repeated Peking's intention to break the superpowers' nuclear monopoly, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to work toward the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Peking's only other announced successful underground nuclear test took place on 23 September 1969 and was reported by NCNA on 4 October. Moscow has promptly reported the new PRC test with a TASS report on the 27th, as usual citing third country reports of the test before it was officially announced in Peking.

MOSCOW ON SPAIN: In cautious speculation on Spain's future in the light of General Francisco Franco's grave illness, Soviet commentators have portrayed the regime as doomed "with or without" Franco. Both PRAVDA's Istomin, in an article on the 30th reported by TASS, and IZVESTIYA's Kamynin, on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable program on the 26th, pointed to discontent even in Spain's armed forces, the regime's traditional mainstay. Both also noted disaffection with the regime among the bourgeoisie and the church. Istomin remarked that the alinement of political forces in the country was "rather complex," citing Western press reports to the effect that a factional struggle was going on "in the top crust itself" in an effort to preserve the regime without essential changes. Kamynin observed that the forces opposing the regime "do not proceed from the same positions," and he noted "it could be a case" of Spain changing from dictatorship to democracy "without a civil war." Without directly criticizing Franco's chosen successor, Prince Juan Carlos, Kamynin found him unpalatable, twice pointing out that Franco had raised the prince "in his own image and likeness" and commenting that "with such political baggage and the succession problems," Juan Carlos' chances of occupying the throne were unpromising. While Kamynin referred only in passing to the opposition Democratic Junta, in which the Spanish Communist Party is represented, Istomin drew attention to the organization's "program of 'democratic breakthrough'" providing for active participation of the popular masses in determining the country's future, and remarked that Spain's "patriotic, progressive forces" called for "radical democratization" as the "sole possible alternative" to one-man dictatorship.

PRC ON USSR-TURKEY: A 22 October Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY signed article castigating Soviet interference in Southern Europe has for the first time criticized Soviet measures allegedly designed to woo Turkey away from the Western alliance and into a position less hostile to the USSR, in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Claiming that Moscow has been

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"intervening in the Cyprus question to gain profits from it," the article argued that Moscow "of late" has been "luring" Turkey into accepting an unspecified amount of Soviet loans. Citing a Turkish weekly's assessment that the loans were "bait" designed to allow two newly built Soviet aircraft carriers to pass from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean Sea, the PEOPLE'S DAILY article asserted erroneously that the tonnage of each carrier "exceeds the internationally agreed level" for such passage and that they had not been allowed to pass through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In fact, the still-in-force terms of the 1936 Montreux Convention permit the USSR, as a "Black Sea power," to exceed the 15,000-ton limit specified for warships of non-Black Sea powers passing through the Turkish Straits.

PRC-DRV TRADE AGREEMENT: An agreement on the "mutual supply of goods and payments" for 1976, signed in Peking on 25 October by DRV and PRC vice ministers of foreign trade Ly Ban and Yao I-lin, was the third in the series of PRC-DRV economic agreements concluded this year. The two previous agreements--one on the supply of goods by China to the DRV in 1976 and the other on an "interest-free loan" by China to the DRV--were signed on 25 September, shortly before the conclusion of the 22-28 September visit to Peking of VWP First Secretary Le Duan. This year's agreements still fall considerably short of the economic pacts concluded last year, which had included "non-refundable" Chinese economic and military assistance, in addition to agreements on China's supply of goods to Vietnam and on the mutual supply of goods and payments for 1975. More agreements may yet be arranged, however. Neither Peking nor Hanoi media have indicated that Ly Ban, who has been in China since 12 August, has departed Peking.

CAMBODIAN DEFENSE MINISTER: Phnom Penh radio on 25 October for the first time confirmed that Deputy Prime Minister Son Sen is concurrently RGNU minister of national defense. Son Sen's position as defense minister was noted in a radio account of a message from him on Romanian army day. In the past Deputy Prime Minister and CPNLF Commander-in-Chief Khieu Samphan had been identified concurrently as defense minister. Phnom Penh radio stopped referring to Khieu Samphan as defense minister immediately after a 12 August press communique named Son Sen as deputy prime minister in charge of defense affairs. Until now, however, Phnom Penh radio references to Son Sen had referred to him only in his new post of deputy prime minister.

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LATIN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: Moscow and Havana predictably have welcomed the 17 October creation of the Latin American Economic System (SELA), an all-Latin organization aimed at planning and fostering economic development in the region. Leonid Kamynin, speaking on Moscow radio's observers roundtable program on the 26th, called the new organization a "serious blow to the notorious pan-American system, which is based on the principles of inequality and discrimination." Asserting that the United States formerly "exercised complete sway in the politics and economics" of Latin countries, Kamynin praised SELA as an opportunity for the region to develop independently, "without any diktat from the senior partner." And Kamynin, like other Soviet commentators, hailed Cuba's membership as an example of the failure of attempts by "imperialist circles" to exclude Cuba from hemispheric affairs. Havana, one of the most enthusiastic advocates of SELA, has praised the official founding of the organization, Havana radio commentator Jorge Martin saying on the 22d that SELA would serve as an avenue of escape from "the U.S. economy's constant cyclical crises." He saw SELA as "the most important step forward taken to date" toward the formation of a pan-Latin organization which would be the economic and political equal of the United States--a long-standing Cuban goal. Although Martin said SELA was not aimed against "any other country," he also noted that the organization supported cartels of banana- and sugar-exporting countries and added that "practically, this constitutes a confrontation with the U.S. foreign trade law."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NORTH VIETNAMESE FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN VISITS EAST EUROPE

A North Vietnamese party-government delegation led by First Secretary Le Duan has concluded a tour of four East European states and arrived in the Soviet Union for an official friendship visit. The 3-27 October East European visits--to Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia--came in the wake of a 22-28 September stay in Peking by the first secretary which ended abruptly, without the usual Vietnamese banquet or joint communique.* In East Europe the North Vietnamese delegation concluded each visit with the expected joint communique; however, there were predictable indications of policy differences between the Vietnamese and their hosts. The delegation also signed economic agreements covering the period of Vietnam's projected 1976-1980 five-year plan and trade protocols for 1976.

The last high-level North Vietnamese visit to Eastern Europe occurred in 1973, in the wake of the Paris peace agreement, when a delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong toured the area in July and August and October and November for the avowed purpose of expressing thanks for allied support during the war. In the same year Le Duan, accompanied by Pham Van Dong, made similar visits to Peking and Moscow.

REFLECTIONS OF DIFFERENCES Throughout its stay in East Europe the Le Duan delegation was hosted by the party chiefs in each country and treated to the standard round of bilateral talks, rallies, and banquets. Although the atmosphere of the delegation's visits was described as warm and friendly, as would be expected, the speeches and joint communiqués suggested there were some differences, particularly over aspects of Soviet foreign policy and relations in the communist world. In assessing the bilateral talks, only the Hungarian communique claimed that an "identity of views" was reached. The German communique said there had been a "useful exchange of views," while the joint communiqués signed in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia did not characterize the results of the talks. (During Pham Van Dong's 1973 East Europe tour, Hungary similarly was the only country in which unanimity was claimed to have been reached with the Vietnamese.) The atmosphere of the talks in the four countries was described, with slight variations in tone, as one of friendship and understanding.

* Le Duan's visit to China is discussed in the 1 October 1975 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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In speeches at gatherings for the Vietnamese delegation, Bulgarian First Secretary Zhivkov and East German First Secretary Honecker were particularly voluble in their praise of Soviet foreign policy and criticism of the "opponents" of detente and those who wished to "reverse the positive results" of the Helsinki accord. Hanoi media excluded these passages from accounts of the East European speeches, and Le Duan displayed Hanoi's long-standing reservations about detente by avoiding these issues in his speeches--just as Hanoi media had virtually ignored the Helsinki Conference itself last August.* All four communiques, however, contained a cryptic endorsement of the achievements of the Helsinki meeting, followed by the standard cautioning phrase that the strengthening of the might of socialist countries is of decisive significance for the preservation of peace and security in Europe.

The Vietnamese avoided East European efforts to apply the experience of the European security conference to Asia. Thus, Hanoi media did not replay either Hungarian First Secretary Kadar's suggestion in a rally speech that the Helsinki conference was an encouraging example for the solution of problems elsewhere, or Zhivkov's flat declaration in his rally speech that Bulgaria supported the Soviet proposal for the creation of a collective security system in Asia.

In proximity to the sections on European security, all four communiques used almost identical language expressing support for the struggle of the Southeast Asian people for peace, independence, and "positive neutrality" and for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and abandonment of U.S. bases in the region. Only the communique with the GDR omitted the reference to neutrality, instead endorsing the struggle of Southeast Asian countries for peace and national independence. The call for a peaceful, independent and neutral Southeast Asia originated with the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) but it has been embraced by Hanoi in the past year as part of an apparent attempt to improve its relations with neighboring states.** Soviet media comment on the ASEAN proposal since the communist takeover in South Vietnam has occasionally endorsed the idea of making Southeast Asia a neutral zone and has indicated that the concept is compatible with the Soviet-proposed Asian collective security system.

* Hanoi media handling of the Helsinki Conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, page 8.

** For background on Hanoi's use of this formulation, see the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 9-12.

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Addressing the problems of world communism, Le Duan's speeches in Eastern Europe consistently called for the "restoration" and consolidation of solidarity among socialist countries and within the international communist movement. The call for restoration of unity originated in the last testament of Ho Chi Minh in 1969 and reflected his desire that China and the Soviet Union resolve their differences. The East Europeans ignored Le Duan's appeal, using standard Soviet-style formulations calling for the consolidation of the unity of the community movement and the "socialist community," implicitly excluding China. Three of the final communiques avoided either formulation, urging the "consolidation and strengthening of solidarity among the socialist countries." The Bulgarian-DRV communique called for the consolidation of the world socialist system and the international communist movement. By contrast, in 1973 Pham Van Dong had won support from both the Hungarians and Romanians for the call to restore unity.

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS The economic agreements concluded by the Vietnamese delegation in Eastern Europe appeared to be geared to Hanoi's upcoming 1976-1980 five-year plan and to involve assistance in the form of long-term loans, rather than outright aid. By contrast, throughout the war years, when long-term Vietnamese planning was not feasible, Hanoi had concluded economic aid agreements on an annual basis. Last year's agreements with East European countries were not uniform but for the most part were described as covering economic, scientific, and technical cooperation for 1975 and did not mention loans.* Planning for long-range economic cooperation had been under discussion in the summer of 1974, however, when DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi led an economic delegation to Eastern Europe to hold talks on long-term economic coordination.**

This year Le Thanh Nghi reportedly signed agreements in all four countries covering economic cooperation during 1976-1980. The inclusion in the agreements of long-term credits was mentioned in all of the joint communiques except the one signed with Czechoslovakia. While Prague media have not been heard to mention loans to Vietnam, Hanoi reports on agreements signed in Czechoslovakia did indicate that long-term loans were included.

* For background see the TRENDS of 13 November 1974, pages 9-10.

** For a discussion of Le Thanh Nghi's 1974 economic aid mission to the Soviet Union and East Europe see the TRENDS of 31 July 1974, pp. 14-16, and of 17 July 1974, pp. 12-13.

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20 - 26 OCTOBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2605 items)</u>		<u>Peking (908 items)</u>	
World Women's Congress, Berlin	(--) 9%	25th Anniversary of Chinese Volunteers' Entry in Korean War	(--) 8%
Hungarian Premier Lazar in USSR	(--) 8%	UNGA 30th Session [Korea Debate]	(7%) 8%
Venus 9 and 10 Space Missions	(--) 8%	Kissinger in PRC	(--) 7%*
[Soviet Leaders' Greetings]	(--) 3%]	Nepal Princes Gyanendra and Dharendra in PRC	(--) 3%
China	(6%) 7%	Long March 40th Anniversary	(6%) 3%
Kissinger in PRC	(--) 2%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Kissinger.